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This article focuses on the role of labour market institutions in explaining different labour 
market developments in European countries, with a special attention to the new European 
Union member countries. This may allow us to analyse effects of various institutional setups 
and of their changes on major labour market indicators. We aim at complementing several 
studies from the late 1990’s by using more recent data that allow us to compare institutional 
setups from the mid 1990’s and early 2000’s both in “old” and “new” EU member states. We 
estimate effects of labour market institutions on various performance indicators 
(unemployment, long-term unemployment, employment, activity rate). Our results confirm 
that high taxes increase unemployment, while active labour market policies tend to reduce it. 
We also show that stricter employment protection, higher taxes and larger economic burden 
represented by the minimum wage decrease employment and activity rate. Moreover, 
statistical tests indicate that there is a difference in the institutional effects between “old” and 
“new” EU members. 
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Introduction 
 
Labour markets remain at the centre of both academic research and policy discussion in most 
advanced economies. Labour markets represent the most diverse, but arguably the most 
important segment of complex market structures that characterize modern economies. Indeed, 
different performance of labour markets in continental Europe and in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries was credited with widening the gap between the two groups of countries in the 
1990’s and early 2000’s.  
However, diversity of labour markets makes them extremely difficult to analyze. Labour 
markets are subject to macroeconomic shocks, microeconomic structures and various regional 
or national “customs” that are often difficult to describe, or even quantify. Until the seminal 
OECD study (OECD, 1994), most analyses concentrated on macroeconomic approach to 
labour market analysis. The OECD report argued that labour market institutions are much 
more important and their proper setup might explain differences among major developed 
countries. While intellectually appealing, the “institutional approach” to labour market 
analysis is not without problems (see e.g. Heckman, 2007). Effect of many institutional 
arrangements is unclear both theoretically and empirically. Moreover, institutions are not 
homogenous across countries, i.e. the same institutional design may have different effects in 
different countries.  
This paper focuses on the role of labour market institutions in explaining different labour 
market developments in European countries, with a special attention to the new European 
Union member countries. Differences in labour market developments in former and new EU 
member states increased since the late 1990s; old region improved its labour market 
performance while new region rather declined. New EU members’ labour markets have been 
exposed to severe shocks and institutional reforms. This allows us to disentangle effects of 
various institutional setups and their changes on major labour market indicators. We follow 
several studies from the late 1990’s (Nickell, 1997; Riboud et al., 2001; Cazes and 
Nesporova, 2003), but more recent data allow us to include dynamic changes in institutional 
setups from the late 1990’s to early 2000’s both in “old” and “new” EU member states. 
In our analysis we rely mostly on the OECD data, as no better dataset with unified 
methodology covering labour market institutions is available. Out of all the new EU members, 
OECD dataset includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia only. Overall, we 
use 19 countries sample that consists of only these four “new” member countries (hereafter   3
“NMS”) and fifteen “old” members (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom; 
Luxembourg is missing, non-EU Norway is added). Thus, given the limited amount of data 
available, our results should be taken carefully.  
The article is organised as follows. In the first chapter, we briefly sketch labour market 
performance in European countries and compare “old” and “new” EU members’ performance. 
In the following chapter, we overview main theoretical arguments about the labour market 
institutions’ role. The third chapter discusses major institutional indicators and their 
developments in the recent years. We argue that the European institutional setups are 
converging, for better or worse. The fourth chapter then presents an econometrical analysis of 
the labour market institutions’ effects. We run four separate regressions, estimating effects of 
labour market institutions on various performance indicators (unemployment, long-term 
unemployment, employment, activity rate). Our results confirm that high taxes increase 
unemployment, while active labour market policies tend to reduce it. We also show that 
stricter employment protection, higher taxes and larger economic burden represented by the 
minimum wage decrease employment and activity rate. Moreover, simple statistical tests 
indicate significant difference between “old” and “new” EU members as far as institutional 
effects are concerned, particularly in case of employment and activity rate. We are, however, 
limited by data availability so we cannot run separate regressions for the two groups to 
identify the differences quantitatively. The final part discusses potential conclusions from our 
research and their limits. 
1. Labour market developments in the new member states in the European context 
Labour markets in the new EU member states were under close scrutiny throughout the 
1990’s. Many authors (Nesporova, 2002; Lechner and Wunsch, 2006) are rather critical of the 
labour market performance. Most authors, however, concentrate on macroeconomic policies, 
blaming large negative shocks for increasing unemployment in these countries. Nesporova 
(2002), for example, devotes only several paragraphs to the discussion of institutional factors 
and is rather sceptical vis-à-vis their effects on labour market developments.
1  
As figure 1 and table 1 below illustrate, NMS10
2 countries witnessed a substantial increase in 
the unemployment rate between 1998 and 2002 when the average unemployment in the 
                                                 
1 Later research by Cazes (2002) and Cazes and Nesporova (2004) indicates that at least some labour market 
institutions matter.   4
NMS10 peaked at almost 12%. It fell since then, rather dramatically particularly after 2005. 
The EU-15 unemployment rate is much more stable: it hovered around 7% in the 1998-2007 
period.
3 During that period, however, several EU countries cut their unemployment rates 
significantly (Spain, Ireland, Finland), while it increased in others (Germany, Portugal). In 
2007, differences among the two groups of countries almost disappeared – see Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Unemployment rates in the European Union (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: 1998, 1999 - data on Malta and Cyprus not available, NMS average covers 8 remaining countries only. 
 
Labour markets’ performance in the EU was rather robust in 2005-2007, as the EU economy 
gathered speed―in some new member states (and also in Ireland and Spain) the labour force 
expanded by 2-4 percentage points. Following some deregulation measures, particularly in 
Spain, two thirds of new jobs were generated in part-time jobs. In several countries (Denmark, 
Ireland, Cyprus, Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the Baltic countries) 
unemployment hovered around 4%. Poland and Slovakia suffered from highest 
unemployment rates (10-11%), followed by large “old” member countries as Germany, 
France, Spain with unemployment rates around 8%.  
Employment rates, perhaps a more appropriate measure of the labour market efficiency, 
increased by 1.6 percentage points in the EU-25 between 1999 and 2005, but the growth was 
concentrated among the “old” members where employment rose by 2.4% while “new” 
members went up by 1% only (see figure 2). The employment jumped by almost 10 
percentage points in Spain. At the same period, employment rather stagnated in Poland and 
Hungary which experience, together with Italy and Malta, very low employment rates of 
                                                                                                                                                         
2 Ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 are referred to as NMS10 in this paper. They are Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
3 Long-term unemployment exhibited the same trends in this period, differences between these two groups of 
countries were even more pronounced.   5
about 57%. Employment rates improved considerably among Baltic States after 2005 and 
pushed up the whole NMS10 average significantly. 
 
Figure 2: Employment rates in the European Union (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: 1998, 1999 - data on Malta and Cyprus not available, NMS average covers 8 remaining countries only. 
 
Table 1.   Unemployment and employment in NMS10, EU-15 and EU-25, 1999-2007 
   Unemployment rate (%) Employment rate (%) 
   1999 2001  2003 2005 2007 1999 2001 2003  2005  2007
Czech  8.6 8.0  7.8 7.9 5.3 65.6 65.0 64.7  64.8  66.1
Estonia  11.3 12.4  10.0 7.9 4.7 61.5 61.0 62.9  64.4  69.4
Cyprus  : 3.8  4.1 5.3 3.9 : 67.8 69.2  68.5  71.0
Latvia  14.0 12.9  10.5 8.9 6.0 58.8 58.6 61.8  63.3  68.3
Lithuania  13.7 16.5  12.5 8.3 4.3 61.7 57.5 61.1  62.6  64.9
Hungary  6.9 5.7  5.9 7.2 7.4 55.6 56.2 57.0  56.9  57.3
Malta  : 7.6  7.6 7.2 6.4 : 54.3 54.2  53.9  55.7
Poland  13.4 18.3  19.7 17.8 9.6 57.6 53.4 51.2  52.8  57.0
Slovenia  7.3 6.2  6.7 6.5 4.9 62.2 63.8 62.6  66.0  67.8
Slovakia  16.4 19.3  17.6 16.3 11.1 58.1 56.8 57.7  57.7  60.7
Belgium  8.5 6.6  8.2 8.5 7.5 59.3 59.9 59.6  61.1  62.0
Denmark  5.2 4.5  5.4 4.8 3.8 76.0 76.2 75.1  75.9  77.1
Germany  8.2 7.6  9.3 10.7 8.4 65.2 65.8 65.0  66.0  69.4
Ireland  5.7 4.0  4.7 4.4 4.6 63.3 65.8 65.5  67.6  69.1
Greece  12.0 10.7  9.7 9.9 8.3 55.9 56.3 58.7  60.1  61.4
Spain  12.5 10.3  11.1 9.2 8.3 53.8 57.8 59.8  63.3  65.6
France  10.4 8.3  9.0 9.2 8.3 60.9 62.8 64.0  63.9  64.6
Italy  11.0 9.1  8.5 7.7 6.1 52.7 54.8 56.1  57.6  58.7
Luxembourg  2.4 1.9  3.8 4.6 4.1 61.7 63.1 62.2  63.6  64.2
Netherlands  3.2 2.2  3.7 4.7 3.2 71.7 74.1 73.6  73.2  76.0
Austria  3.9 3.6  4.3 5.2 4.4 68.6 68.5 68.9  68.6  71.4
Portugal  4.5 4.1  6.4 7.7 8.1 67.4 69.0 68.1  67.5  67.8
Finland  10.2 9.1  9.0 8.4 6.9 66.4 68.1 67.7  68.4  70.3
Sweden  6.7 4.9  5.6 7.4 6.1 71.7 74.0 72.9  72.5  74.2
United  5.9 5.0  5.0 4.8 5.3 71.0 71.4 71.5  71.7  71.3
NMS10  11.5 11.1  10.2 9.3 6.4 60.1 59.4 60.2  61.1  63.8
EU-15  7.4 6.1  6.9 7.1 6.2 64.4 65.8 65.9  66.7  68.2
EU-25  8.8 8.1  8.2 8.0 6.3 62.9 63.3 63.6  64.5  66.5
Source: Eurostat 
Note: 1998, 1999 - data on Malta and Cyprus not available, NMS average covers 8 remaining countries only. 
 
The Lisbon Agenda of the EU, an ambitious programme aimed at increasing the EU’s 
competitiveness, stressed the importance of labour market performance and urged the EU   6
countries to reform their labour markets. The EU policy seems to be captured by the 
“flexicurity” buzzword that is supposed to combine flexibility and security. The prime 
example of flexicurity is Denmark and its “Danish Golden Triangle” where flexible labour 
market and generous social security system are supported by active labour market policies.  
Indeed, the OECD ranked Denmark as the most intense reformer of labour markets, followed 
by the Netherlands and Finland. Out of the EU-25 that are the OECD members as well, the 
slowest reformers are squarely among the “new” member countries: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. The new member states score particularly poorly in working-time 
flexibility―see the European Commission (2005). On the other hand, as we argue in the 
following chapter, the new EU member states have more liberal labour market institutions in 
other perspectives.  
It may be thus argued that there are several groups of countries within the EU. There are 
reformers among “old” members, led by Denmark, Ireland and other small countries. They 
typically have low unemployment rates, high activity rates, but also high social security 
expenditures, high taxes and large part of work force in “augmented” jobs either created or 
subsidized by governments. The other group, large “old” members―Germany, Italy, and 
France―are inconsistent in their reform efforts and suffer from high unemployment and high 
social expenditures.
4 Among the new members, the three Baltic States are the keenest 
reformers, even though their activity and employment rates are still low. At the same time, the 
central Europe trio of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland is not adapting their labour 
markets to changing environment. The Czech Republic benefits, so far, from relatively high 
activity rates, but Poland and Hungary are suffering from low activity. 
5 
2. Labour market performance and the role of institutions  
 
Diversity of labour market institutions is often perplexing. While some are intuitively clear, 
others are difficult to define (social dialogue, health and safety rules, work councils, etc.). 
Countries differ extensively in their use of labour market institutions: Germany and Sweden 
are examples of tightly regulated labour markets where institutions’ predominant concern is 
protection of existing jobs. Anglo-Saxon countries are more often associated with labour 
institutions that rely on markets and favour job creation (and destruction) rather than 
protection. The evident unemployment gap between the (continental) Europe and US led 
                                                 
4 Germany scored better in 2006 and 2007 as it reformed its labour market rather dramatically.  
5 For a more detailed discussion of transition labour markets performance, see Flek and Vecernik (2005).    7
many observers to argue that the more flexible US institutions were at the root of the superior 
performance.
 6 
Unfortunately, economic theory does not provide clear answers as what labour market 
institutions’ effects may be. If we assume that bargaining on labour markets is efficient, firms 
maximize their profits and market institutions do not affect aggregate efficiency.
7 More 
realistically perhaps, other models assume that institutions may change the total productivity. 
Trade unions increase insiders’ wages, firms reduce employment and labour reallocates to 
shadow (or non-unionized) sectors with lower productivity―total productivity then falls and 
distribution effects are unclear, as some workers gain, some lose.
8  
On the other hand, some institutions may improve market outcomes if they move market 
closer to the “ideal”. Increasing trust between workers and managers/owners may increase 
workers’ willingness to accept wage cuts during economic hardship (Freeman and Lazear, 
1995). Olson (1990) argued that even centralized wage bargaining in a small open economy 
may improve total outcome, as central trade unions would internalize the negative 
externalities from industry level bargaining. Indeed, Teulings and Hartog (1998) showed that 
wages in countries with centralized bargaining reflected economic conditions much better 
than wages in the (decentralized) US labour market.  
Therefore, one may choose to argue that labour market institutions do not change, decrease or 
increase efficiency of the labour markets. Since the mid 1990’s the discussion of labour 
market institutions was dominated by the strong claim by Nickell (quoted in Nickell et al., 
2005) who argued that labour market institutions and their changes may explain changes in 
the OECD countries unemployment. This claim was later undermined by studies by 
Blanchflower (2001) or Baker et al. (2005) who argued that these results are sensitive to 
model specification―adding additional years, countries or indicators eliminated significance 
of Nickell’s estimators.  
To complicate analysis even further, one has to keep in mind that institutions evolve over time 
and their effects may change as well. Freeman (2007) argues that even institutions’ effects on 
labour markets may change, so the same institutions may have different effects in different 
countries or in different periods. The institutions adapt to the country’s general traditions and 
                                                 
6 See Freeman (2007) for a detailed discussion of labour market indicators.  
7 They may affect, however, distribution of profits. Most labour market institutions aim at increasing the labour 
share of the total profit. For example, minimum wages, employment protection laws, collective bargaining 
increase payouts to workers after the implementation. While the total product remain unchanged (firm is 
efficient), the labour share was increased.   8
habits and those institutions undermining countries’ economic goals are eventually abandoned 
or ignored, so we do not observe a random set of institutions across countries. Calmfors and 
Drifill (1988) showed that unemployment was highest in countries with industry-based 
collective bargaining―the famous inverse U hypothesis. However, this relationship all but 
disappeared in the 1990’s, as acknowledged by the OECD Employment Outlook in 2004. 
Therefore, medium level of bargaining might have been particularly inefficient in the 1980’s 
but as labour market participants in countries with this bargaining system suffered from 
higher unemployment, the nature of bargaining might have changed. Lindbeck (1996) makes 
a similar point, arguing that welfare system may have important dynamic effects that may 
become apparent only after habits and social norms adapt.  
3. Institutions and their effects 
The institutional barriers to the functioning of the labour market and its rigidity are not easily 
quantifiable, as discussed above. Recent theoretical and empirical studies usually use a set of 
institutional indicators, as there is not any single measure of institutional set-up. These 
“institutional environments” are compared to labour market performance to assess the real 
labour market flexibility/rigidity―see e.g. Nickell (1997), Riboud et al. (2001), Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000), Cazes and Nesporova (2003), ILO (2001). We adopt the same approach 
and we focus on five institutional areas: employment protection legislation, wage setting 
framework (trade unions and minimum wage), system of taxation and labour market policies.
9 
Employment protection legislation 
The aim of employment protection legislation (EPL) is to improve workers’ employment 
conditions and enhance their welfare. The regulation refers to legal framework governing 
conditions of hiring and firing. It mainly restricts the employers’ freedom to dismiss workers 
and thus reduces the flows into, but also out of, unemployment.   
Employment protection, beside its effect on workers welfare resulting from higher job 
security, stabilizes the employer-employee relationship and might stimulate the firm’s 
investment in human capital of workers, leading to a higher productivity. On the 
macroeconomic level, it might smooth labour market adjustment to adverse shocks. On the 
                                                                                                                                                         
8 The same holds for minimum wage or employment protection laws. 
9 The list is not exhaustive as there are many factors influencing the labour market flexibility. Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000) emphasise the importance of adverse economic shocks and their interaction with labour market 
institutions for explaining the unemployment dynamics and differences among the countries. Riboud et al. 
(2001) underline the influence of macroeconomic and structural reforms on labour market performance of CEE 
countries in 1990s.   9
other hand, there might be found significant negative side effects on worsening the firms’ 
flexibility in changing economic conditions. Moreover, it widens the distance between the 
labour market “insiders” and “outsiders” (Layard et al., 1991) and in this sense might 
contribute to labour market rigidity and higher unemployment.
10 The overall net effect of EPL 
is thus ambiguous and concerns employment, unemployment, labour costs and productivity. 
Empirical literature gives rather mixed evidence of employment protection consequences for 
labour market performance (see OECD, 1999). Generally, there is no clear effect of stricter 
EPL on overall unemployment, but it may increase its duration and change its composition.  
We follow the OECD methodology (1999, 2004) for measuring the strictness of employment 
protection. The OECD developed a system of indicators, including a single overall composite 
indicator. As many as twenty two measures describing various aspects of EPL, covering 
regular and temporary contracts and collective dismissals, were aggregated into a summary 
indicator using a set of weights. EPL index 1 covers conditions of regular and temporary 
contracts, EPL index 2 covers in addition terms of collective dismissals. Indices reach the 
values from 1 to 6, low index indicates flexible legislation and liberal hiring and firing 
environment, while stricter protection is reflected in a higher value of the index. 
Overall situation in European countries is shown in table 2. As can be seen, NMS do not 
constitute a homogeneous group in terms of EPL strictness, especially in 1998. Slovakia had 
the toughest legislation of the four countries, but there was a significant decrease and it fell 
under the average of the NMS until 2003. Slight increase in EPL strictness is evident in case 
of Hungary and Poland, but Hungary, together with Slovakia, still remains more liberal in 
terms of EPL strictness, while the Czech Republic and Poland are being less liberal. 
Differences among NMS group tend to decrease in time.  
The EPL strictness varied more among the “old” members; however, it has converged 
somewhat in 2003 as well.
11 Southern European countries have the toughest regulation while 
the rules are more relaxed as one moves north; English speaking countries exhibit the most 
liberal EPL. Generally EPL in NMS is not as strict as in the other group―the average EPL 
index was significantly lower in both periods. Also the decrease in cross-country differences 
                                                 
10 More distinct impact can be expected for long-term unemployment. On the other hand, short-term 
unemployment might be decreased by reducing the inflows to unemployment.  
11 Employment protection has been relaxed in OECD countries since 1990s according to recommendations of the 
OECD Jobs Strategy (1994), but the changes applied to regulation of temporary contracts mainly, leaving the 
regular employment protection unchanged (Brandt et al., 2005).     10
in time was larger among the NMS (coefficient of variation fell by 50% in NMS, while there 
was only a slight decrease in the “old” states).  
Table 2.   Employment protection legislation in the selected European countries 
   EPL1 EPL2 
  1998 2003 1998 2003 
Belgium 2.15 2.18 2.48 2.50 
Czech Republic  1.90 1.90 1.94 1.94 
Denmark  1.42 1.42 1.83 1.83 
Germany  2.46 2.21 2.64 2.47 
Greece  3.54 2.83 3.49 2.90 
Spain  2.93 3.05 2.96 3.07 
France  2.98 3.05 2.84 2.89 
Ireland  0.93 1.11 1.17 1.32 
Italy  2.70 1.95 3.06 2.44 
Hungary  1.27 1.52 1.54 1.75 
Netherlands  2.12 2.12 2.27 2.27 
Austria  2.21 1.94 2.38 2.15 
Poland  1.49 1.74 1.93 2.14 
Portugal  3.67 3.46 3.66 3.49 
Slovakia  2.38 1.42 2.53 1.60 
Finland  2.09 2.02 2.18 2.12 
Sweden  2.24 2.24 2.62 2.62 
United Kingdom  0.60 0.75 0.98 1.10 
Norway  2.69 2.56 2.72 2.62 
NMS average 1.76 1.65 1.98 1.86 
„old“ EU average  2.32 2.19 2.49 2.39 
NMS coefficient of variation  0.28 0.13 0.21 0.12 
„old“ EU coefficient of variation  0.37 0.34 0.30 0.26 
Source: OECD (1999, 2004) 
 
Minimum wage setting  
Policies aimed at increasing low incomes from employment are nowadays a common practice 
in almost all the developed countries in the world. Minimum wage might be either statutory, 
established by the government, or as an extension of collective bargaining agreements.
12 
Introduction of minimum wage might pursue different goals. Its advocates argue mainly by 
decreasing poverty, reducing income disparities, protection and motivation of low productive 
workers. However, minimum wage might not be an effective tool to promote these goals as it 
can increase incomes only of those individuals who work. Moreover, minimum wage might 
represent a large burden for employers, who might decide to fire workers, or not to employ 
them in the first place, whose productivity would not reach the minimum wage. To the extent 
in which these negative consequences would occur, potential benefits for working poor would 
be limited. 
Minimum wage is a controversial instrument of labour market policies. Economic theorists 
have not reached a broad consensus regarding its consequences so far. However, it is usually 
generally accepted that although it might have some positive impacts on motivation to 
                                                 
12 Many „old“ European countries don’t have legally binding minimum wage, but usually there exist an effective 
minimum wage determined by collective bargaining (Austria, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Sweden).   11
productivity increase among low-paid workers (Stigler, 1946; Cahuc a Michell, 1996), as a 
motivation device in efficient wages framework (see Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995, or Manning, 
1995), or in case of a monopsony, there exists a threshold, over which the negative effects of 
minimum wage prevail. Minimum wage increases the unemployment and causes economic 
losses in terms of economic efficiency then. The effect is stronger for particular groups of 
workers with the lowest productivity. This situation is to certain extent confirmed by existing 
empirical research. For a summary of empirical research results on this issue see e.g. Brown 
et al. (1982) or OECD (1998). 
Situation in the NMS and other European countries is given in table 3. All the four NMS have 
introduced legally binding minimum wage. The highest real minimum wage value (measured 
in purchasing power standard―PPS value of the wage) can be found in the Czech Republic; 
on the other hand, Slovakia has the lowest level. Still, the differences among countries are not 
so marked. There is a clear trend in increasing the minimum wage tariffs. Nevertheless, the 
minimum wage levels are still significantly lower than in the “old” member states (roughly 
40% of their level in 2004).
13 As to the real economic burden represented by the minimum 
wage, it might be measured by a relative share of minimum wage on median wage in the 
economy. Although relatively low, minimum wage represents a significant proportion of 
median wage in the NMS, thanks to a relatively lower overall wage level. The share was 
roughly 40-50% in 2003 and there was an evident increase between the examined years, with 
the exception of Slovakia. By raising its level, the differences between the NMS and the other 
group almost disappeared in 2003. 
Table 3.   Minimum wage in the selected European countries  
  
Hourly real minimum 
wage, USD (PPS) 
Minimum wage/ 
median wage 
  2000  2004  1999  2003 
Belgium 6.54 6.54 0.49 0.47 
Czech Republic  1.63 2.55 0.26 0.37 
Greece  3.39 3.58 0.51 0.49 
Spain  3.13 3.08 0.31 0.29 
France  6.37 6.92 0.60 0.61 
Ireland  5.43 5.81 0.42 0.38 
Hungary  1.27 2.06 0.36 0.49 
Netherlands  6.62 6.83 0.51 0.51 
Poland  1.87 2.04 0.36 0.40 
Portugal  2.69 2.71 0.44 0.44 
Slovakia  1.27 1.47 0.47 0.45 
United Kingdom  5.50 6.34 0.42 0.44 
NMS average  1.51 2.03 0.36 0.43 
„old“ EU average  4.96 5.23 0.46 0.45 
Source: OECD  
                                                 
13 Still, this value may not reflect the real influence of minimum wage system in particular countries, as there 
may exit also sub-minimum wage tariffs applying for the most impacted groups of workers (young, least skilled, 
part-time workers). These are quite common in Europe (Dolado et al., 1996).   12
 
Collective bargaining and trade unions 
The role of trade unions in collective bargaining process is also a factor influencing wage 
formation and determining labour costs and flexibility of firms. In most of the European 
countries, trade unions play an important role. Their power was traditionally measured by the 
share of workers who were trade unions’ members―trade union density. However, even if the 
density is rather low in some countries, it is a common practise to extend the agreements also 
to non-unionized workers, thus covering a large share of employees in the whole economy 
(e.g. France, Spain). Thus, the degree of collective bargaining coverage (share of all salary 
earners whose wage is actually determined by a collective agreement―legal extension of 
bargained wage rates to non-unionized workers) might be a more reliable indicator in terms of 
real economic consequences. The level of union coordination and centralization is also an 
important aspect. Coordination refers to ability to coordinate bargaining among various 
unions and employers’ organizations. Centralization refers rather to the level of bargaining 
(firm, industry, country) and the role of the government; high degree of centralization does 
not necessarily have to mean close coordination. 
Theory suggests that the trade unions generally tend to raise wages and thus influence 
unemployment. The more workers they cover, the higher this impact. This effect might be in 
reality offset by the extent to which unions and/or firms coordinate their wage determination
14 
(Nickell and Layard, 1999; OECD, 1997). Overall impact might be also lowered by greater 
degree of product market competition (Boeri, 2005). The estimation of total effect of trade 
unions on unemployment and labour market performance is not robust in most empirical 
studies. For summary of empirical finding se for instance OECD (1997, 2004).  
Table 4 summarizes the key features of collective bargaining process in the selected European 
countries and the NMS. Clearly both trade union density and collective bargaining coverage 
are much lower in the NMS. There is also the lowest degree of bargaining centralization and 
coordination in the NMS with the exception of Slovakia. Both trade union density and 
collective bargaining coverage show higher trade union influence in “old” member countries, 
which might be on the other hand offset by higher degree of centralization and coordination. 
                                                 
14 According to Layard et al. (1991), average wages are more responsive to labour market conditions in those 
countries where wage bargaining is more coordinated. Higher coordination then means less rigidity in terms of 
lower wage pressure and reduce the negative unemployment consequences of trade union bargaining.   13












  2000  2000  2004  1995-2000  1995-2000 
Belgium 56 90 90 3  4
Czech Republic  27 25 27 1 1
Denmark  74 80 77 3 3
Germany  25 68 70 3 4
Greece  27 71 65 … …
Spain  15 80 80 3 3
France  10 90 90 2 2
Ireland  38 67 44 4 4
Italy  35 80 90 2 3
Hungary  20 30 40 1 1
Netherlands  23 80 80 3 4
Austria  37 95 98 3 4
Poland  15 40 40 1 1
Portugal  24 80 80 4 4
Slovakia  36 50 40 2 2
Finland  76 90 90 5 5
Sweden  79 90 90 3 3
United Kingdom  31 30 40 1 1
Norway  54 70 74 4.5 4.5
NMS average  25 36 37 1.3  1.3
„old“ EU average  40 78 77 3.1  3.5
Source: OECD  
Note: Centralisation: 1 = Company and plant level predominant; 2 = Combination of industry and company/plant level, with an important 
share of employees covered by company bargains; 3 = Industry-level predominant; 4 = Predominantly industrial bargaining, but also 
recurrent central-level agreements; 5 = Central-level agreements of overriding importance; Co-ordination: 1 = Fragmented company/plant 
bargaining, little or no co-ordination by upper-level associations; 2 = Fragmented industry and company-level bargaining, with little or no 
pattern-setting; 3 = Industry-level bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and moderate co-ordination among major bargaining actors; 4 
= a) informal co-ordination of industry and firm-level bargaining by (multiple) peak associations; b) co-ordinated bargaining by peak 
confederations, including government-sponsored negotiations (tripartite agreements, social pacts), or government imposition of wage 
schedules; c) regular pattern-setting coupled with high union concentration and/or bargaining co-ordination by large firms; d) government 
wage arbitration; 5 = a) informal co-ordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing union confederation; b) co-ordinated 
bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze, with a peace obligation. 
 
System of labour taxation 
Taxes on labour are expected to influence negatively labour markets, as taxes drive a wedge 
between the labour cost to the employer and take-home wage for the employee. The larger the 
wedge is, the more pronounced negative effect on labour market will be. In this respect, it is 
irrelevant whether we analyze income taxes or social security contributions, as highly 
redistributive nature of most social security programs separates their contributions from 
entitlements. Several studies confirmed this theoretical conclusion by empirical tests (Nickell, 
1997), while some are rather inconclusive (Scarpetta, 1996). Daceri and Tabellini (2000) 
show that taxes are more significant in countries with strong trade unions  
Labour taxes in the European Union are very high, the highest in the world―see table 5. 
Measured as percentage of GDP, taxes on labour reach 27% in Sweden, 22% in France and 
Belgium, more than 20% of GDP in Denmark, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and Finland. 
Ireland, Greece and the two Mediterranean islands (Cyprus and Malta) emerge as the low-tax 
countries with the labour taxes’ share just above 10% of GDP.   14
Impact of labour taxes is, however, better measured by their microeconomic effects. This is 
approximated by the tax wedge. As tax systems are progressive in all EU countries
15 the tax 
wedge differs for different income groups. For average wage earners, it reaches more than 
40% in several countries, both from the NMS and “old” members groups: Poland, France, 
Sweden, and Belgium. Tax wedge tend to fall for lower incomes, but it remains relatively 
high for countries as Poland, Sweden or Spain even for workers earning less than average 
wage (see European Commission, 2005). In general, taxes on labour paid by both workers and 
employers are lower in the NMS, but the total tax wedge on labour is slightly higher here. 
Table 5.   Taxation in the selected European countries 
  
Taxes on labour paid by employer and 
employee,% GDP 
Total tax wedge 
(%) 
  2000  2004  2000  2004 
Belgium  22.3 21.9 57.1 55.4 
Czech Republic  17.4 18.0 42.7 43.5 
Denmark  21.8 20.1 44.3 41.3 
Germany  21.8 20.1 53.9 53.3 
Greece  12.6 12.9 38.4 38.3 
Spain  13.9 14.1 38.6 38.7 
France  21.7 22.2 49.6 49.8 
Ireland  11.4 10.4 28.9 26.2 
Italy  17.6 18.1 46.4 45.4 
Hungary  18.6 18.6 52.7 50.3 
Netherlands  18.2 15.9 39.7 38.6 
Austria  21.5 21.0 47.3 47.5 
Poland  14.3 13.1 43.2 43.3 
Portugal  13.5 .. 37.3 36.8 
Slovakia  16.0 .. 41.8 42.5 
Finland  21.0 20.6 47.8 44.5 
Sweden  27.8 26.9 50.1 48.4 
United Kingdom  14.2 13.8 32.1 33.4 
Norway  16.6 .. 38.6 38.1 
NMS average  16.6 16.6 45.10  44.91 
„old“ EU average  18.4 18.3 43.34  42.38 
Source: OECD, Eurostat  
Note: Total tax wedge on labour: The combined central and sub-central government income tax plus employee 
and employer social security contribution taxes, as a percentage of labour costs defined as gross wage earnings 
plus employer social security contributions (average wage). The tax wedge includes cash transfers. 
 
Labour market policies 
Labour market policies (LMP) may have ambiguous impact on unemployment and labour 
market performance. Active LMP aim at enhancing human capital and sustaining 
employability of their participants. The provisions may improve the efficiency of job-
matching process. Although negative effects do occur (substitution effects and deadweight 
losses―see for instance Martin, 2000), empirical studies often find overall positive effects of 
these provisions on unemployment (OECD, 1993).  
                                                 
15 Even „flat-tax“ Slovakia has, in fact, progressive tax system due to its relatively high non-taxed minimum.    15
Passive LMP may on the other hand decrease the job-search intensity and motivation of 
unemployed to accept a job offer and lower the economic costs of unemployment, raise the 
employees’ wage claims and thus might push up the overall unemployment. At the same time 
it might increase the effectiveness of matching process and improve the labour market 
performance. The generosity of unemployment insurance system is of particular importance. 
It depends mainly on benefits payment duration and their relative level compared to previous 
labour income, i.e. the replacement rate. The more generous the system, the larger the adverse 
effects (Layard et al., 1991). Negative consequences of generous unemployment insurance 
system and high passive LMP spending might be partly offset by suitable active LMP 
measures aimed at returning the unemployed back to work. Final effect of LMP is then given 
by the relative scope of these programmes and their features.  
Table 6.   Labour market policies in the selected European countries 
Spending on active 















  1999  2004  1999  2004  2001  2004  2001  2004  2001  2004 
Belgium 0.159 0.137  0.275 0.287 unlim. unlim. 63  63  47 52
Czech Republic  0.022 0.031  0.036 0.031 6 5 50  50  36 30
Denmark 0.338 0.333  0.594 0.484 60 48 64  61  61 59
Germany 0.165 0.120  0.268 0.243 12 12 61  61  60 60
Greece 0.028
1 0.016 0.040
1 0.043 12 12 45 48 0 0
Spain 0.081 0.067  0.112 0.140 24 21 72  69  25 25
France 0.130 0.101  0.168 0.179 60 23 71  73  42 40
Ireland 0.270
1 0.138 0.333
1 0.200 15 15 29 30  50 51
Italy 0.103
1 0.074 0.056
1 0.095 6 6 52 54 0 0
Hungary 0.057 0.051  0.080 0.062 12 9 47  43  25 25
Netherlands 0.513 0.313  0.716 0.485 60 24 71  71  58 61




2 18 12 47 52  32 30
Portugal 0.173
1 0.104 0.182
1 0.196 30 24 78 78  24 25
Slovakia 0.026
3 0.023 0.022
3 0.019 9 8 64 64  65 21
Finland 0.120 0.111  0.227 0.235 25 23 61  60  51 49
Sweden 0.272 0.197  0.251 0.210 15 28 78  77  52 52
United Kingdom  0.058 0.111  0.108 0.062 6 6 45  45  45 45
Norway 0.253 0.180  0.147 0.195 36 36 66  66  44 41
NMS average  0.034 0.028  0.045 0.039 11 9 52  52  40 27
„old“ EU average  0.186 0.142  0.252 0.223 33 27 61  61  41 41
Source: OECD. Ministry of Economy and Labour of Poland ( 
2); year 1998 ( 
1); year 2001( 
3). 
Note: Initial replacement rate: net value of unemployment benefits in the initial phase of unemployment relative 
to average production wage of a single person, without children. Long term replacement rate: net value of 
unemployment benefits, social assistance, family and housing benefits relative to average production wage of a 
single person, without children; average over 60 months of unemployment. 
 
Main characteristics of LMP systems are presented in table 6. There are very significant 
differences between the two groups of countries. NMS in average spend relatively small 
amount of resources on LMP. This spending in average represents about 0.03―0.04% GDP 
per 1 percentage point of unemployment in these countries; there was a slight decrease 
between 1999 and 2004. Among the “old” members, active labour market policies   16
expenditure as a share of GDP per 1 unemployment percentage point was five-times higher 
than in the NMS and even six-time higher in case of passive labour market policies spending.  
Data also reveal differences among the countries in the duration of unemployment insurance 
benefits entitlement. Duration of payments was 10 months in average in the NMS, which is 
roughly one third compare to the “old” member countries.
16 Among the NMS, the longest 
entitlement period may be observed in Poland, the shortest in the Czech Republic. On the 
other hand, variation in replacement rates is not so marked, especially in the initial stage of 
unemployment (roughly 50% in the NMS and 60% in “old” member countries). The long-
term replacement rate fell significantly in the NMS in 2004, caused mainly by substantial 
decline in case of Slovakia. Consequently, the NMS average lies well below the “old” 
members’ average.  
4. Empirical estimation of institutional barriers to the labour markets flexibility 
In this chapter, we present estimates of the labour market institutions’ effects on various 
labour markets’ indicators. To this end, we use an econometric model inspired by recent 
empirical research and by economic theory set out in part 3 of this paper.  
As there is only scarce data available, we constructed a panel of nineteen European 
countries
17 and used data from years 1999 and 2004.
18 Out of all the countries in the panel, 
fourteen are “old” member countries, one is Norway, which we classify as an old member 
country for purposes of this paper, and remaining four countries are the NMS. The source of 
the data is mainly the OECD and partly also Eurostat. 
We examine the impact of institutional factors on four indicators of labour market 
performance (Eurostat methodology): unemployment rate (UR), long-term unemployment rate 
(LtUR), employment rate (ER) and activity rate (AR). In line with the previous research, the 
dependent variables are represented in logs. The regression coefficients are estimated using 
the standard random effects generalized least square estimation procedure. The regression 
equation has following form: 
lnX ti = α + β1 EPLti + β2 MWti + β3 CBCt + β4 TAXti + β5 ALMPti + β6 UBRRti + 
+ β7 INFLti + β8 LEFTti +  εt i          (1),  
                                                 
16 In its effect on labour market performance this might be eventually offset by differences in social benefits 
system―after the unemployed lose the entitlement for the unemployment insurance benefits and are covered by 
other provisions of social security system. 
17 Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Hungary, Netherlands, 
Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Norway.  
18 Or years close to these dates in case of missing data.   17
where X takes the form of UR, LtUR, ER, and AR in consequent regressions. 
The independent variables and their expected effects were described in the previous section. 
In our regression, we used the second version of the EPL index as it covers wider spectrum of 
protection policies (EPL). Minimum wage (MW) is a cluster variable constructed according to 
minimum wage level and its relative share on median wage in the economy. The trade unions’ 
power is represented by the collective bargaining coverage (CBC) as a more representative 
measure. Tax system consequences are reflected by total tax wedge on labour (TAX). Finally, 
to reflect the influence of labour market policies, expenditure on active LMP (ALMP) and 
initial unemployment benefits replacement rate (UBRR) is included. Active labour market 
policies expenditure is instrumented
19 
We use the actual rate of unemployment in our regressions, but labour market institutions 
affect rather the equilibrium unemployment. To reflect this, additional variable was used in 
the model―the change in the annual rate of inflation (INFL; see Nickell, 1997). This variable 
captures the influence of economic cycle and may be also considered an indicator of 
macroeconomic policy stance. Finally, unemployment level might be in reality also 
influenced by political preferences of governments and conflict of interest over the power 
resources (see for instance Korpi, 1991). To account for these political factors, one more 
variable was added in the regression model―the government orientation with respect to the 
economic policy. Variable LEFT is a dummy acquiring 1 for parties defined as communist, 
socialist, social-democratic or left-wing, where we expect greater orientation on social issues 
resulting in lower unemployment.
 20 As economic policy takes time to influence labour market 
performance, we use the LEFT dummy with a one year lag. 
The model analyzes mainly the basic correlations between the labour market performance and 
institutions. Its deeper explanation power is rather limited due to the lack of data on more 
countries and other relevant variables that might affect the dependent variables.
21 Moreover, 
only four NMS are covered in the sample and therefore it is not possible to run a separate 
analysis for this group of countries. Only the differences in the role of institutions between the 
whole group of countries and the “old” member countries and its implications for the NMS 
were examined using the Chow test (see also Cazes and Nesporova, 2003). Regression 
                                                 
19 This variable is endogenous because it relates the expenditure to the actual rate of unemployment. For this 
reason we instrumented this variable by a new variable relating the expenditure to the average unemployment 
rate in 5-year period before the actual year. 
20 The source of the data is the World Bank’s database of political institutions; for details see Keefer (2005).   18
estimation results are summarized in table 7. Our findings are generally in correspondence 
with the previous research of Cazes and Nesporova (2003) and Nickell (1997). 
The first model examines role of institutions in unemployment differentials among European 
countries. Out of six institutional variables, only two have significant effect on unemployment 
differences and dynamics among European countries―tax wedge on labour and active labour 
market policies. While higher tax burden significantly increases the unemployment rate, 
active labour market policies work in the opposite direction and may offset the negative effect 
of taxation. None of the remaining variables is significant for explaining the development of 
unemployment. Therefore, our results are consistent with standard theoretical concepts.  
The second model where we use long-term unemployment as a dependent variable gives 
similar results. Here the estimated regression coefficients for tax wedge on labour and active 
labour market policies are even more pronounced. Moreover, minimum wage has a moderate 
positive effect on the long-term unemployment (this variable was not significant for the 
overall unemployment). 
Table 7.   Regression estimation results 
  Unemployment rate LT unemployment rate  Employment rate  Activity rate 
1.1264 *  -0.4768    4.3198  ***  4.3592    Constant 
(-0.5688)  (0.9534)   (0.1317)    (0.0980)  
0.0359    0.1297    -0.0548  *  -0.0369 **  EPL index 
(-0.1196)  (0.2294)   (0.0294)    (0.0180)  
0.0824    0.1803 *  -0.0230  *  -0.0165 *  Minimum wage 
(0.0565)  (0.1000)   (0.0134)    (0.0091)  
-0.0019    -0.0064    0.0013     0.0008    Collective bargaining coverage 
(0.0043)  (0.0078)   (0.0010)    (0.0007)  
2.1675 * 4.3988 *  -0.6917  **  -0.5750 *** Total tax wedge on labour 
(1.1900)  (2.0037)   (0.2761)    (0.2046)  
-2.1375 *** -3.1181 *** 0.2221     0.0094    Active labour market policies 
spending  (0.5992)  (1.1574)   (0.1479)    (0.0900)  
0.0038    -0.0004    0.0029     0.0032 **  Unemployment benefits initial 
replacement rate  (0.0079)  (0.0137)   (0.0019)    (0.0013)  
0.0094    0.0258    -0.0045     -0.0019    Inflation (change p.p.) 
(0.0145)  (0.0306)   (0.0037)    (0.0020)  
-0.0711    -0.1048    0.0177     0.0088    Left-wing oriented government 
(0.0773)    (0.1589)    (0.0196)     (0.0110)   
N (countries, time):  38 (19, 2) 38 (19, 2) 38 (19, 2)    38 (19, 2)  
R
2 overall:  0.3008    0.1543    0.1027     0.2459   
R
2 within:  0.5120    0.5551    0.6196     0.5695   
R
2 between:  0.4990    0.5238    0.5856     0.5543   
*** significant 1%, ** significant 5%, * significant 10% 
Random effects generalized least squares estimation method, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, World Bank, own calculations 
 
In the third and fourth model, explaining labour supply decisions, institutional factors proved 
to be more powerful. EPL, taxes on labour and minimum wage are all significant in both 
                                                                                                                                                         
21 These are for example the role of product market reforms (Griffith et al., 2006 or Boeri, 2006) or importance 
of adverse economic shocks (Blanchard, Wolfers 2000).   19
models. Further, unemployment benefits’ initial replacement rate is significant for explaining 
the differences in activity rates. On the other hand, collective bargaining coverage and active 
LMP do not seem to have a significant effect. Stricter EPL, larger economic burden 
represented by the minimum wage, and higher tax wedge on labour tend to decrease both 
employment and activity rate. On the other hand, unemployment benefits initial replacement 
rate tend to raise the activity rate by increasing motivation to relying on the social system (the 
effect on overall unemployment is positive, although insignificant). Neither inflation nor left-
wing orientation of the government proved to have a significant effect in any of the models. 
The effect of the trade unions collective bargaining over wages seems to be limited as well.  
All our regression models explain 50-60% of the variation in the dependent variables among 
19 European countries. Explanatory power of the models is higher in case of between-groups 
variation; the variation within countries in time is less robust. This conclusion is in line with 
the results of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) who stress the importance of diverse reactions of 
each state’s institutions to adverse economic shocks.  
Due to limited data, we could not run separate regressions for “old” and “new” EU member 
countries. Therefore, we tested hypothesis of stability of the regression coefficients between 
the whole sample of nineteen countries and the sub-sample of fifteen “old” members for any 
of the dependent variables. This was done by Chow tests for stability of estimated 
coefficients
22 for each of the dependent variables. The tests’ results differ for the 
unemployment and labour supply models. As far as unemployment is concerned, the tests 
have not rejected the hypothesis of stability of coefficients and we cannot prove different 
behaviour of the NMS group on 5% significance level.
23 On the other hand, in both 
employment and activity rate models we can reject the hypothesis of stability of regression 
coefficients on 5% significance level.
24 In other words, NMS and “old” Europe exhibited 
differing patterns of labour markets reactions to various institutional settings in examined 
                                                 
22 We used a modified version of the test hypotheses and statistics, because number of observations in the NMS 
group is smaller than the number of parameters, nNMS <k, and thus we can not use the standard methods in this 














F (nNMS, nOE – k).  
23 The test statistic reached 2.40 for total unemployment and 1.91 for long-term unemployment. The 
corresponding critical value of F distribution d.f. 8, 21 at 5% level of significance stood at 2.42. 
24 The test statistic reached 3.77 for employment and 4.07 for activity rate. The corresponding critical value of F 
distribution is the same as above.   20
period. However, due to limited data available, we were not able to analyze the new member 
states’ patterns of behaviour separately.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper discussed the role and impact of labour market institutions on the performance of 
labour markets. Our discussion indicated that the relationship is not straightforward nor 
statistically very robust. Institutions are difficult to define, measure, compare between 
countries, and their effect may change over time. The paper, nevertheless, analyses labour 
market institutions in nineteen European countries and finds that they do have some effect on 
major labour market indicators. We found that the labour markets in “new” member states 
enjoy more liberal employment protection legislation and lower minimum wages. Also, trade 
unions seem to have less say in the NMS: both trade union density and collective bargaining 
coverage are significantly lower in the NMS as well as degree of bargaining centralization 
and coordination. Both workers and employers pay lower taxes on labour in the NMS, 
although total tax wedge on labour is slightly higher here. The NMS spend relatively less on 
both active and passive labour market policies and unemployment benefits replacement rates 
are slightly lower. However, the differences between the NMS and old Europe are slowly 
diminishing in time. 
Our econometric analysis suggests that two institutional factors significantly influence 
unemployment and long term unemployment: total tax wedge on labour and active labour 
market policies. While higher tax burden significantly increases the unemployment rate, 
active labour market policies work in the opposite direction and may offset the negative effect 
of taxation. Our model proved to be more powerful in explaining employment and activity 
rate. Stricter employment protection legislation, higher tax wedge and minimum wage are 
likely to reduce both employment and activity rate; unemployment benefits replacement rate 
tend to increase the activity. On the other hand, collective bargaining over wages and political 
orientation of the government do not have significant effect on labour markets performance.  
When analyzing the patterns of effect of institutional factors on labour market developments 
in the NMS and “old” member countries, we were not able to prove different behaviour of the 
NMS group in unemployment models. On the other hand, as far as employment and activity 
rate are concerned, significant differences between the two groups of countries seem to 
persist. However, due to limited data available, we were not able to analyze the NMS 
behaviour in detail and further research using a broader data sample is needed. We may 
speculate that further European integration will lead to continuing convergence of European   21
labour markets and thus that the NMS group will become even more like the “old” member 
countries, at least in labour market institutions’ effects. 
Our results indicate that European countries should concentrate on lowering current high 
taxes on labour that discourage formal labour market contracts and lead to higher 
unemployment and lower activity rates. Similarly, restrictive employment protection laws 
should be relaxed as to make process of hiring and firing more market friendly. This would 
increase activity rate and employment in most European states. Large economic burden 
represented by the minimum wage in many countries should be relaxed in order to increase 
the motivation of firms to hire low-wage workers and decrease the unemployment. Social 
goals of the minimum wage should be transferred to other social policy instruments. Last, 
active labour market policies seem to be effective in pulling the unemployment down and thus 
compensate for negative effects of other institutions.  
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